UN Human Rights Expert Visits Morocco

The United Nations'  (UN) human rights expert Juan E. Méndez   is in Morocco now  to " assess improvements and identify remaining challenges." He will be there until the 22nd of September 2012 .  Human Rights Watch is asking him to look into the torture of protesters. The official UN announcement about the visit  is pasted below.
___________________      Morocco: First visit by UN Special Rapporteur on torture

GENEVA (12 September 2012) – Independent human rights expert Juan E. Méndez will visit Morocco from 15 to 22 September 2012, to assess improvements and identify remaining challenges regarding torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, particularly in light of adopting a new Constitution in July 2011.

“My ultimate task is to engage with decision-makers and key actors to help the authorities uphold the rule of law, promote accountability for past abuses and allegations of torture and ill-treatment, fulfill the right of reparations for victims, and to ensure that alleged perpetrators are held responsible in conformity with international law,” Mr. Méndez said.

The Special Rapporteur, who visits the country at the invitation of the Government, will hold meetings with authorities, the judiciary, civil society, the national human rights institution, United Nations agencies, victims and their families. In Morocco, the Special Rapporteur plans to visit Rabat, Salé, Casablanca, Meknès and Skhirat-Témara.

Mr. Méndez will share his preliminary comments and recommendations at a press conference to be held on 22 September 2012, at 15:00, at the Hotel Diwan McGallery (place de l’Unité Africaine, 10005 Rabat). The Special Rapporteur will present a final report to the Human Rights Council in 2013.

Juan E. Méndez (Argentina) was appointed by the UN Human Rights Council as the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in November 2010. He is independent from any government and serves in his individual capacity. Mr. Méndez has dedicated his legal career to the defense of human rights, and has a long and distinguished record of advocacy throughout the Americas. Learn more, log on to: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Torture/SRTorture/Pages/SRTortureIndex.aspx

(*) The independent expert will also visit Laâyoune, Western Sahara, on 17 and 18 September 2012.

Nothing Has Changed: Morocco & the "Arab Spring"

Here is a piece from the Levantine Culture Center website about what, if anything, has changed in Morocco during the past few months of hoopla.
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Morocco and the Arab Spring
posted September 2, 2011 - 5:51pm by Editor
An inside look at the mood west of Libya and Tunisia
By Youssef Ait Benasser

The other day, a big wig in the Moroccan blogosphere asked in one of his articles: what has changed in our lives? This question reflects the preoccupation of Moroccan society as a whole with the adoption of the new constitution, which passed on July 2nd, 2011 with a 98% approval rate. The referendum woke up the whole country from an era of political quietism, thus raising people's hopes and expectations for a better tomorrow. Two months have passed since then, and for many, it is now time for assessment, following the popular saying "a good dinner frees its scent as of the early afternoon."

An analysis of the current situation in the "Most Beautiful Country in the World" (according to an advertisement for tourism in Morocco) shows that the Kingdom is evolving at two distinct speeds: the pace of official discourse displaying promises of a new era on the one hand, and on the other, another pace that completely contradicts that speech. Since the 2nd of July, repression has not rested; public media outlets remain just as biased and closed to opponents as they were previously; corrupt and abusive officials haven't been ejected from the ruling circles (and some have even gained new prestigious titles); political prisoners have not been freed; and Rachid Nini—the nation's most popular columnist—has been sentenced to jail. Local and international newspapers are still seized and censored each time the King is concerned (most recently, the French weekly Courrier International has been censored because of a caricature of the King ). To partisans of the February 20 Movement, nothing seems to have changed. Some even argue things have worsened as the July referendum's legitimacy untied the Palace's hands.

What change do we want?
The change Moroccans expect consists of putting an end to the system's cronyism and corruption, thus creating an opening for equal opportunities. Tensions in Morocco are indeed mainly due to social, economic, and political "elevators" all being out of service. Parties have become hermetic corporatist groups, the economy is languishing under royalties-owned monopolies and domination, and the education system is no longer a ladder that leads to ascending social status. Getting out of this gridlock is necessary if the system wants to avoid an escalation of tension. Promises of democracy have obviously failed in cleansing the streets of protest. What Moroccans are yearning for are actions that can be felt, and up to now, there has been no political will to implement any.

What change are we getting?
The general elections date has been set for late November. The legislative election is expected to be the first under the rule of the new constitution. It is officially featured as a turning point in Moroccan politics and the start of a new democratic, free phase. However, the handling of the legal and logistical preparation of the event has not changed in comparison with the way things were done in our 2007 legislative elections. Back then, the participation rate was as low as 37%. The parliament that emerged from the results was the least representative of the people's will. As a result of regrouping and shifting alliances, the biggest party in the House is one that didn't even exist at election time. Many legitimately fear that things will not differ in November. The almighty Minister of Interior Affairs, appointed by the King himself, is using redistricting as a tool for imposing a pre-conceived political map. His ministry is indeed the only institution in charge of elections and it undergoes no real accountibility as it is completely dependent on the Royal Palace.Moroccans might not see much change in their lives as political beings, but they will witness changes on the socio-economic level. Government's generous social policy has more than exceeded the country's financial budget. Decrees related to integration of unemployed degree-holders into public service, or automatic and general raises in salaries, have been able to keep the middle class out of the streets for now. But it will not be long before it generates the opposite effects as sovereign debt drastically raises leading to a double-dip recession.

Either there is a change or there is not.

Aware of this complex situation that Morocco is facing today, the February 20th Movement has raised the cogent questions, and is therefore a legitimate counter movement. It is now up to the system to provide the appropriate answers. And with a social time bomb ready to explode, the system may not have that much time.

Young Moroccans Unlikely to Stop Pushing for Democratic Change

Here is an article from the New York Times on the Moroccan youth movements dissatisfaction with what some believe to have been a move towards democracy in the country.
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Morocco's Democratic Changes Fail to Appease All

By AIDA ALAMI
Published: July 20, 2011

RABAT, MOROCCO — A stressed middle-aged woman in a taxi in Casablanca looked with disdain at thousands of protesters on a main avenue. “We are fed up with them,” she told the driver. “Can’t they just leave us in peace. They wanted a new constitution. They got it. What else do they want?

“They are fighting for our rights,” he replied. “I hope they keep on marching until our health and education systems are fixed and corruption, the biggest ill of this country, is gone.”

A landslide vote in a July 1 referendum paved the way for a new constitution, introducing more freedoms and gender equality. The constitution was approved by 98 percent of those who voted, winning King Mohammed VI congratulations from world leaders, including President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

But critics dispute the validity of the referendum, saying that only 13 million of 20 million eligible Moroccans were registered to vote. They also say the constitution fails to enshrine significant separations of powers within the government.

Leading democracy activists including the February 20 Movement for Change, which began on Facebook and has carried out a series of rallies in major cities, have rejected the outcome and pledged to continue to fight for the establishment of a fully democratic state.

Abdeslam Maghraoui, a political science professor at Duke University in North Carolina specializing in North Africa, said the referendum was a short-term fix for Morocco’s problems.

“It seems that the monarchy and its supporters have managed to pull together a hasty and contested constitutional referendum,” he said. “This will give the monarch a few weeks or months to claim a political victory.”

Mr. Maghraoui said irregularities in the voting process and opposition from large segments of civil society, the main Islamist movement and some political parties had delegitimized the process.

“I would not be surprised at all if we go back to an atmosphere of crisis and possibly violence before the end of the year,” he said.

When the February 20 movement started organizing, shortly after the fall of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, the Moroccan regime activated an extensive propaganda campaign to paint protesters as enemies of the state manipulated by the Western Sahara liberation movement, Polisario.

Still, the movement, linking human rights activists, small leftist parties, youth activists and a banned Islamist party, Justice and Charity, mobilized thousands of people in more than 50 cities and it has since organized marches every Sunday, countrywide.

Its most significant victory has been to raise awareness among Morocco’s politically disengaged youth, who for the first time decided to get involved. Two weeks after taking to the streets, the movement gained ground when the king, in a speech on March 9, promised significant constitutional changes and the introduction of more personal liberties. He then appointed a commission to draft a new constitution, which he unveiled on June 17.

Still, the king’s call to Moroccans, citing the Koran, to vote for the charter was perceived by opponents as an improper interference in the process.

Mehdi Soufiani, a 24-year-old law school student in Rabat, said: “The king is an arbitrator. He shouldn’t have influenced the voters, making the vote about his popularity and not about whether the constitutional changes are what the country needs.”

In July, an organization of Moroccan students in France, Cap Democracy Morocco, which advocates the establishment of democratic institutions, organized a three-day workshop in Rabat that invited young people and scholars to a discussion titled, “Thinking Democracy After February 20.”

Younes Benmoumen, a 24-year-old graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies and president of the association, called the referendum a plebiscite on the king and the constitutional changes only cosmetic.

“There is a complete absence of a democratic spirit in the constitutional reform process,” Mr. Benmoumen said, “and no actions were taken to show a willingness of the regime to change.”

During a debate at the Cap Democracy workshop, many raised concerns that the movement had failed to assemble crowds as large as in Tunisia and Egypt and said it risked running out of steam and dying out.

Fouad Abdelmoumni, a member of the Coalition for Parliamentary Monarchy, a group of parties and activists that supports February 20, told young people at the workshop: “A push for radical change in society is only starting to bloom. It will not easily happen. Protesters are going to need to show endurance and patience because the road is still long.”

Najib Akesbi, an economist who teaches at the Institute of Agronomy in Rabat, predicted that the coming legislative elections would send people into the streets again. He said the referendum vote was flawed by coercive pressures from imams and local government officials, vote rigging and one-sided broadcast media coverage.

“Absolutely nobody knows what the majority of Moroccans think as a result of years of repression,” he said. “The movement remains strong in its fundamentals, at its core, and the protesters remain very determined. After Ramadan and summer, the protests will very likely intensify in September.”

Analysts say the newly engaged if widely disparate groups of young Moroccans are not likely to stop pushing for change. That assessment echoes what the young protesters themselves say.

“We are fighting for something meaningful and we will win,” said Mr. Benmoumen. “We are not subject to any deadline, and the course of history is on our side.”

Buying the King Some Time: Morocco's Referendum is a Very Small Step

Here is a piece from the Economist, which offers a well-rounded, honest look at the recent referendum and how it does not really address the most pressing economic and quality of life issues for the average Moroccan.
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Morocco's Referendum
A very small step
The king has offered some reforms, but the opposition is not satisfied

Jul 7th 2011 | BENSLIMANE |

WITH the easterly wind, the shergui, enveloping them in hot desert air, most of the residents of Benslimane, a sleepy town in north-west Morocco, waited till dusk to vote in a constitutional referendum on July 1st, pressed by officials who wanted a strong turnout for what has been as much a test of King Mohammed VI’s popularity as a poll about reform.

Businessmen backing the yes vote held celebratory street parties. Imams at Morocco’s mosques were instructed to preach in favour of what was heralded as the king’s constitution. But even in conservative Benslimane, some 800 dissidents campaigned for a boycott. A headmaster at a local school serving as a polling station was overheard muttering that the whole exercise was a masquerade.

The result—98.5% in favour—drew guffaws of disbelief from members of the February 20th movement. The coalition of leftists, independent liberals and Islamists from the banned Justice and Spirituality movement surprised many when its protests for social justice and democracy drew thousands of sympathisers across the kingdom earlier this year. It called for a boycott of the referendum.

The new constitution includes some important reforms. It establishes human rights as core principles, recognises Berber, spoken by many Moroccans alongside Arabic, as an official language and calls for gender equality. It gives new powers to the prime minister and parliament and inaugurates a much-needed overhaul of the judiciary. It no longer deems the king sacred, though he is still “Commander of the Faithful”.

Critics complain that many of the new constitution’s articles refer to “organic laws” that have not yet been written, making the extent of some changes uncertain. Others depend on the creation of special commissions, mostly headed by the king. Political parties, a majority of whom backed the “yes” vote, only saw a draft of the constitution at the last minute. No mention is made of King Mohammed’s promise, which came in a speech in March, of moving towards a parliamentary monarchy. The king remains—directly or indirectly—in control of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, or as the new constitution puts it, a “supreme arbiter” of political and institutional life. In many respects, the new constitution merely codifies an existing method of governing that allows the palace to micromanage at its whim.

When the February 20th movement was launched, inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions earlier this year (but never calling for the king’s head), it drew much public sympathy. Many Moroccans felt enthusiastic about Mohammed VI, dubbed the “king of the poor” at the beginning of his reign in 1999. But less so in recent years, during which press freedoms were dramatically curtailed, incidents of torture returned and corruption increased.

Yet many Moroccans have been frightened by the attempted regime change in Libya and Syria. “We want transformation without violence,” says Saad Eddine Othmani, a leader of the opposition Islamist Justice and Development Party, which supported the new constitution. “This…is a beginning.”

General elections expected later this year could bring further change. But although the new constitution may have bought the king some time—helped by a doubling of food and fuel subsidies, the creation of new government jobs and the boosting of civil-service salaries—the regime is still not dealing with people’s main grievances, notably failing public-health and education systems, and rampant corruption. The political elite needs to take note, cautions Omar Belafrej, the head of a left-leaning think-tank. “There is little goodwill left.”

In Morocco: Voting Early and Often

Few are surprised that the "vote" for the constitution passed.
Here is an interesting piece from Al-Arabiya on voting irregularities in Morocco, which actually seem to be par for the course.
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Mustapha Ajbaili: In Morocco, ‘Vote early and vote often’ even if the results are preordained

Saturday, 02 July 2011
By MUSTAPHA AJBAILI

On the day my country was asked to go to the polls and say “Yes” to a new constitution, I called my parents who live in a tiny Berber village southeast of the country to ask them if people were going to vote.

My father told me that local authorities, represented by the Moqaddam, brought him voting cards for me and for my brothers who live outside the country. The Moqaddam asked my father to cast vote on our behalf.

This was without the apparent consideration to the fact that we might vote in our consulates abroad. Apparently it was O.K. to vote twice than not vote at all. Amid calls for boycott, turnout was key in the first constitutional referendum during the reign of King Mohammad VI.

Videos of people casting ballots without neither voting cards nor national ID cards are abundant on the Internet. In some cases, authorities used school buses to transport the elderly from remote areas to the voting centers.

The voting activities on Friday, of course, quickly spawned jokes on the Internet. Here’s one popular joke:

A man voted “No” for the new constitution by mistake. As he walked home, he realized his mistake and returned to the polling center to ask officials if he could change his vote. They told him: We already corrected that mistake for you, just don’t do it again.

But in this referendum, there is something positive, after all: I found out that the Moroccan administration is so developed and advanced that it could count ballots nationwide, including from hundreds of villages scattered and isolated in the Atlas mountains, and do this in record time--four hours after the closing of the polling centers. What an extraordinary job you have done, my country.

A One-Sided Campaign for the Moroccan Constitution, or Stop Praising Morocco for Being a Model of Reform it Hasn't Yet Become

Constitution. Can't live with one, can't live without one (apparently).
Here are links to 3 recent articles from the Guardian, The Brookings Institution, and AFP about the Moroccan constitution and the run-up to the typically one-sided election. The Brookings article is also pasted below.
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One Sided Campaign Spurs Moroccans to Vote "Yes" to Reforms

Morocco's Moment of Reform?

Morocco's Reform Reflect Real Divisions Within the Society

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Morocco's Moment of Reform?

Anouar Boukhars, Assistant Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center

The Brookings Institution
June 28, 2011 —

Keen observers of Morocco have long argued that the gradual democratization of the rules of the political game will not materialize without bottom-up pressure from ordinary Moroccans. It is public outrage over corruption and political systems oriented around power and privilege that have served everywhere as a catalyst for systemic change. Despite the popularity of the monarchy in Morocco, there has been a growing mismatch between the public’s aspirations for development and democracy and ruling elites’ insistence that the existing institutional architecture is needed to accommodate gradual reforms while maintaining stability.

In the absence of a credible opposition willing to challenge the monarchy’s prerogatives, it seemed only a severe crisis of governance or external shock could force democratic change onto the policy agenda. That moment finally came with the stunning overthrow of the strongmen of neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. Those dramatic events gave birth to the February 20 protest movement. Despite its relative failure to mobilize large numbers of Moroccans, the protesters—a loose coalition of leftists, liberals and Islamists—injected a new nervousness in the corridors of power. The monarchy quickly grasped that the strength of the leaderless movement did not come from its numbers but from the legitimacy of their demands.

King Mohammed VI’s March 9 speech, in which he outlined parameters for constitutional change, was a direct reaction to the rise of new opposition forces. In an attempt to seize the initiative, he promised wide-ranging reforms, including an elected government and independent judiciary. He announced the formation of an ad-hoc committee entrusted with revising the constitution. The king’s preemptive moves, coming so quickly after the initial protests, helped in stealing some of the opposition’s momentum.

Indeed, the last two months have seen the February 20 movement lose some steam, limiting its ability to reach the levels of popular mobilization seen in Egypt, Yemen or Bahrain. In addition, public perception of the protesters has shifted as the movement struggles to articulate a workable vision for political change while shaking off suspicions it has been hijacked by radical Islamist forces. The horrendous terrorist attack in Marrakesh on April 28—in which 17 were killed—only intensified the uncertainty surrounding the movement and heightened anxiety that social and political agitation could end up benefiting violent Salafi movements.

These fears accentuated with the revolts of Salafi prisoners in May and the hardening of the February 20 demands, as reflected in their calls for cancelling the king’s popular Mawazine Festival (featuring Shakira) and direct attacks on Morocco’s notorious intelligence services (DST) for running secret detention facilities. The protesters’ targeting of the DST came at an inopportune moment, as the agency’s reputation for effectiveness was boosted with its swift arrests of the perpetrators of the Marrakesh attack. The February 20 refusal to back down elicited a violent response from the state’s security services, leading to demonstrations on May 29 in which dozens injured and one killed—the pro-democracy movement’s first “martyr.”

With King Mohammed’s June 17 speech outlining long-awaited constitutional revisions, February 20 finds itself at a difficult crossroads, trying—and struggling—to devise a response to one of the few Arab regimes that has demonstrated a flexible and apparently effective approach to the Arab revolts. Its lack of charismatic leadership and raucous decision-making process have also given the impression of a movement lacking in organizational discipline and riddled with ideological contradictions.

On the eve of the king’s speech, the balance of power between the regime and the protesters had clearly changed from the early months of 2011. In a move that kept labor unions and other syndicates off the streets, the government doubled subsidies, raised public sector salaries, increased minimum wage, recruited 4,300 graduates in the public sector, and cancelled farmers’ debt. Unlike the zero-sum political games of other Arab states facing turmoil, the Moroccan regime skillfully portrayed the promise of top-down reform as a win-win compromise between the old authoritarian constitution and the parliamentary monarchy model demonstrators have been calling for.

The new constitution provides for an “elected” prime minister drawn from the ranks of the largest party in parliament. With the king’s consent, he has the authority to appoint and fire ministers as well as dissolve parliament. Under the proposed reforms, parliament—which had long been relatively weak—now has the potential to play a more assertive role. The exercise of parliamentary oversight of the executive branch is strengthened by lowering the threshold for launching investigations (just one-fifth of its members) and introducing a censure motion against cabinet ministers (one-third). The new constitution also sets into motion a decentralization process, whereby more power is devolved to elected regional councils. On the flip side, the constitution maintains the king’s dominant position in Moroccan politics. He remains the country’s supreme religious and military authority. In matters of security—it is up to the king to decide what exactly that means—he, rather than the prime minister, will have the authority to convene the cabinet. In other words, the king will continue to have veto power over all major decisions.

Despite its failure to significantly limit the king’s powers, the new constitution provides a margin of political maneuverability that did not previously exist. The key question, then, is whether Morocco’s established political parties will use it. The success of the king’s reforms—thus far unrealized—will depend on the ability, or more likely the willingness, of parties and civil society organizations to maintain pressure on the monarchy and push the envelope further. Here, there is little reason to be optimistic. The parties’ responses to the king’s original March 9 speech were disappointing, as evidenced in their timid proposals for constitutional reform.

With few exceptions, none of the parties dared discuss the provisions outlining the king’s religious (article 19), “sacred” (article 23), and legislative (article 29) powers. Even the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), arguably the country’s only credible opposition actor, adhered strictly to the framework that the king laid out in his two major speeches. It should come as no surprise, then, that the political class assured the public that the proposed constitution exceeded their demands and expectations.

It is perhaps unrealistic—and at odds with much of political history—to expect King Mohammed, however benevolent, to voluntarily diminish his own relevance as monarch. Certainly, he can be blamed for falling short of February 20’s expectations, but the legal opposition, including Islamists and leftists alike, bears responsibility for failing to push harder. Of course, it is difficult to determine the origins of the problem. Political parties, after all, were legalized and allowed to participate in elections because they accepted the king’s legitimacy and prerogatives. They operate in an environment where speech criticizing the king—who the constitution considers “inviolable”—is criminalized.

Many Moroccans hold out hope that the youth wings of the established parties succeed in challenging (and perhaps dislodging) their compromised leadership of patronage-driven elites and politicians. Whatever its tangible successes or failures, the effects of the February 20 movement are undeniable. The movement has helped bring to the fore a new dynamic of young political activists mobilizing against entrenched power structures and calling for greater democracy and representation not just in Morocco as a whole but also within the political parties and organizations of which they are a part.

There is now, then, an unprecedented opportunity for both sides. The new constitution empowers the parliament and the political parties to play a more assertive role—if they choose to play it. The threat of revolt and instability—as well as their own indigenous protest movement—give them bargaining power vis-à-vis the king. Importantly, the constitution’s provisions also allow the king to use his unlimited prerogative to block real changes. What he does, and chooses not to do, is critical. As unlikely as it now seems, the best-case scenario is that the king follows the spirit rather than the letter of the new constitution, respects the will of his people, and resists the urge to intervene in affairs of the elected government. Constitutions matter, but what matters more is what people do with them.

This is where Morocco’s friends in the West come in. The time for prioritizing economic liberalization at the expense of democratic reform is over. While Morocco may be more “progressive” than most its neighbors, it is still a state that relies on political restrictions and repression, albeit with a subtler touch. The United States and the European Union should stop heaping praise on Morocco for being a model of reform it hasn’t yet become. American and EU policy must be re-oriented to focus on a number of critical priorities: freedom of association and speech, constraining the powers of the king and the makhzen (royal court), and strengthening the role of elected institutions, such as parliament. Meanwhile, economic aid, as the new European Neighborhood Policy states, must be linked to the idea of “more for more” with “precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions.”

King Mohamed has declared his commitment to substantive reform and democratization. It is only fair that the United States and Europe hold him to his own promises. The stakes are considerable. If constitutional reforms lead to separation of powers, independence of the legislature and judiciary, and a monarchy that removes itself from day-to-day rule, the regional implications could indeed be significant. Then—and only then—should Morocco be considered a “model.”

The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same ?

Here is a commentary from Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
It gives a good background to the main issues and parties involved in the constitution debate. At the end she comments that, "The new constitution might bring about significant change, but only if Moroccans continue to exercise pressure on the king."
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The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same?

Marina Ottaway Commentary, June 20, 2011

The constitution King Mohammed VI announced to his country on June 17 has been greeted by Moroccans with a great deal of ambivalence. Although it appears to be a foregone conclusion that a majority of Moroccans will vote “yes” in the referendum announced for July 1, many will do so with reservations. The young protesters who have been organizing periodic demonstrations beginning on February 20—hence the name, February 20 movement—have already announced that they do not intend to stop their actions. In fact, protests took place on June 19, drawing thousands of protesters in Casablanca and smaller numbers in other cities.
A large number of interviews during a recent trip to Morocco suggest that the king may well have succeeded in staying ahead of the protest that has led to the demise of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and plunged Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain into turmoil and violence. Whether this is just a short-lived victory in the first skirmish of a long battle or a turning point on the road to transforming Morocco into the Arab world’s first constitutional monarchy will depend not only on how the king acts in the coming months, but also on the capacity and willingness of Moroccan political organizations to build on the opportunities the constitution offers them. It may also depend to some extent on the persistence of a protest movement that has so far not been able to mobilize the huge crowds seen in Tunisia and Egypt.

Drafting the Constitution
The constitution, like all preceding ones, was written by a commission of experts appointed by the king, rather than by an elected constituent assembly or another representative body. It thus falls in the category of constitutions granted to the nation by the king, rather than those crafted by a representative organization embodying popular sovereignty. The guidelines for the new constitution were outlined in a speech given by King Mohammed VI on March 9 and the commission subsequently worked to flesh out an outline provided by the palace or, as Moroccans put it, “le pouvoir.” The commission was headed by Abdellatif Menouni, an advisor to the king, leaving no doubt where the directives came from.

The palace also set up a consultative body to work in conjunction with the commission of experts. The strangely named “mechanisme de suivi,” or accompanying mechanism, was also headed by an advisor to the king, Mohammed Moatassim, and functioned as liaison between the drafters of the constitution and political parties, labor unions, businessmen associations, human rights organizations, and other groups or even individuals interested in having an input in the new constitution. Some presented entire constitutional drafts, some only suggestions on key points. Once the submissions were made, however, there was no follow up or debate. The organizations were not shown a draft of the new constitution until June 8 and even then they were not shown a written document but only able to listen to an oral presentation that they discussed in a marathon ten-hour meeting. Inevitably, in the following days the country was abuzz with conflicting rumors of what the new constitution entailed, as various parties and individuals leaked their version to the press. The members of the “mechanism” only saw a written draft on June 16, the day before the king presented it to the nation in a televised speech. Similarly, the council of ministers was asked to vote on the draft on the same day of the public announcement.

Despite the narrow limits of consultation and participation imposed on the drafting of the constitution, the process was probably more open than previous ones. The mainstream political parties represented in the parliament accepted the process and have already made it clear that they will campaign for a “yes” vote in the referendum. This is not surprising, because the parties represented in the parliament are tame and more concerned about maintaining their prerogatives by supporting the initiatives of the monarchy than setting forth programs of their own. Remarkably, the Party for Justice and Development, the Islamist party that came in second place in the 2007 parliamentary election but remains in the opposition, has made it clear that it supports the new constitution, arguing that it contains sufficient guarantees of democracy. The major reason for the party’s acquiescence is apparently the desire to continue and complete the process of integration of the Islamists in the legal political process, a goal that the PJP has been working toward for years.

The February 20 movement on the other hand rejected the new constitution even before it was unveiled because of the manner in which it was drafted and pledged to continue protesting. The February 20 movement has never succeeded in mobilizing huge crowds similar to those that brought down Zine al Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. By the participants’ own estimates, their most successful protests were carried out on March 20 in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and a number of other towns, but even these protests were relatively small compared to those other countries experienced.

Like protests movements in other Arab countries, the February 20 movement is a leaderless and structureless amalgam of young people. It holds monthly general assemblies in the towns where it exists, with each assembly being autonomous of the other. The assemblies are open to the public and coordination among the different groups takes place, to the extent it does, via Facebook—the number of users in the country doubled in the last few months. The movement is looked at with suspicion by the mainstream political parties, although, as in other countries, the young wing of many parties have joined in without official blessing by the parent organization. The movement appears to have broad demands—essentially for democracy and jobs—but not anything that could be called a program.

Parallel to the youth groups that constitute the February 20 movement, a number of leftist political parties, independent labor unions, left-leaning human rights organizations, and Islamist movements have set up a Council to Support the February 20 movement. Most important among them appear to be the Islamist movement al-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity, or Justice and Spirituality as it insists on translating the name recently), the United Socialist Party (PSU), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH). Given the array and the ideological diversity of parties and organizations that belong to it, the support council is deeply divided with members forming alliances against each other. More structured than the movement itself, the support council holds meetings and issues communiqués, but it is not clear that the members of the February 20 movement themselves agree with the positions taken by the support council or even, as some conversations revealed, know of its existence.

Identity Politics
The two most controversial issues to surface during the debate over the constitution were related to the definition of the identity of the Moroccan state: whether Morocco should be defined as an Islamic state, and whether Morocco should recognize Amazigh, the language spoken by the Berber minority, as an official language.

The discussion concerning the place of Islam is caught in the problem of the relationship between Islamist parties and organizations and “civil” ones—the increasingly accepted word to denote parties that outsiders would define as “secular.” Such parties refuse to be characterized as secular, fearing the latter term can be interpreted as implying irreligiosity. The term civil not only has no such implication, but also put the religious parties somewhat on the defensive as being “uncivil.” The tension between Islamic and “civil” parties is not unique to Morocco but common to all Arab countries, particularly in this period of transformation. Indeed relations are even more difficult in Tunisia and Egypt. In Morocco, the Party for Justice and Development is legal and has been participating in several cycles of parliamentary and local elections. Although it remains a devil for some, it is at least a known devil. But the issue is far from being solved even in Morocco.

What exactly happened in the debate over the place of Islam in the Moroccan state remains difficult to understand with precision, in part because of the confusion between what different organizations actually said and what they are alleged to have said and in part because of the use of code words that are not always clear. Islamists have been accused by civil parties of having insisted that Morocco continue to be defined as an Islamic state. Islamists deny that this is the case and argue that they even favored a definition of Morocco as a “civil state with an Islamic reference.” On the other hand, there is no doubt that a suggestion that the constitution includes a reference to “freedom of conscience,” rather than the guarantee that people belonging to other religions would be free to perform their religious practices was vehemently denounced by the general secretary of the PJD as opening the way to unacceptable and provocative behavior such as public display of homosexuality and violating in public the Ramadan fasting. In the end, the constitution defines Morocco as a Muslim state in the preamble, and states that Islam is the state religion in Article 3, which also guarantees freedom of religious practices to all faiths. Compared to the text of most Arab constitutions—which proclaim sharia as one of the sources, if not the source of law—the new Moroccan constitution, like the previous one, is quite liberal. It should also be noted that in Morocco religion is an integral part of the king’s power: as the officially recognized “commander of the faithful” the king would see his position somewhat diminished if Morocco was not defined as an Islamic state.

The new constitution also recognizes Amazigh as an official language, despite the objections by conservative elements and by those who thought such recognition would dilute Morocco’s Arab identity. It also contains a reference to the plurality of influences on the Moroccan culture, including Andalusia, more broadly the Mediterranean culture, the people in the Sahara, Christianity, and Judaism. The compromise in this case appears to be language that makes it clear that the official status of the Amazigh language will be implemented slowly.

The King’s Power
Identity issues caused the most controversy while the constitution was drafted, but in the long run the real issue is how much power the king will exercise under the new constitution—and thus how much progress Morocco has made toward becoming a constitutional monarchy or, in the language favored in Morocco, a parliamentary monarchy where the king does not govern.

Even the most ardent supporters of the new constitution do not claim that the new charter reduces the king to ruling without governing. That, they argue, is neither possible nor desirable in Morocco. The new constitution reserves for the king three areas as his exclusive domain: religion, security issues, and strategic major policy choices. In addition, the king will remain the supreme arbiter among political forces. Under those rubrics, the king could very well control all important decisions, if he so chooses.

There are new formal limits on the king’s power. He cannot choose any prime minister he wants, but must respect election results and name “the president of the government,” as the prime minister is now called, from the party that received the most votes. The king will no longer participate in and preside over the meetings of the cabinet. Rather, it is the president of the government who now presides over the renamed Council of Government. However, the king presides over the cabinet, which in that case is still called the Council of Ministers, when security issues or strategic policy decisions are at stake. Since the constitution does not clearly spell out what would constitute a strategic decision, it appears that the decision is up to the king himself. His position as arbiter also gives him the power to weigh in on the most important issues.

The constitution undoubtedly broadens the power of the parliament, allowing it to pass laws on most issues; it takes steps toward protecting the independence of the judiciary; and it increases the role of a number of independent commissions. What it fails to do clearly and unequivocally is reduce the power of the king.

How much change
The new constitution might bring about significant change, but only if Moroccans continue to exercise pressure on the king. The history of political reform in Morocco shows the importance of pressure. The first big recent wave of change came when King Hassan was approaching the end of his life and understood the importance of opening up the political system some in order to facilitate his son’s rise to the throne. He was under pressure to make changes. King Mohammed followed on the path of reform, but progress was made increasingly slowly as he felt more sure of his position. It took the Arab Spring, with the example of what can happen to regimes that refuse to change and the beginning of street protest in Morocco, for the king to conclude that it was time to relaunch reform.

The impact of the new constitution depends on the way in which it is implemented. As an opposition legislator put it to this author, the constitutional text has potential. In order for it to be realized, the parliament has to adopt the necessary legislation and make sure that it provides maximum space for the political forces. The past performance by the parliament suggests that it is not a foregone conclusion that the parliament will make good use of the potential. Although Morocco has a stronger tradition of political parties than most other Arab countries, the parties suffer from the same problems as the entire political system does: they are top-heavy, internally undemocratic, with little renewal of leadership.

As a newer party more committed to change, the PJD may be less hidebound than other organizations, but one party is not enough. Furthermore, if the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) wins the parliamentary elections that will probably be held in October, the power of the king is likely to remain strong. The PAM was created by a friend of the king before the 2009 municipal elections. Not only did it perform well at the level of the municipalities, but it established a strong presence in the parliament without ever participating in a parliamentary election—members of other parties simply moved over to the newly created entity. Before February, the PAM was expected to do extremely well in parliamentary elections, but it is not so clear how recent events will affect it. There is no doubt, though, that if a party close to the king was to win elections the reform momentum could easily be dissipated. The outcome will also be affected by the capacity of the February 20 movement to stay alive if a large majority of Moroccans approve the constitution in a credible referendum.

How far the king’s top-down reform will go may well depend on the strength of a bottom-up push by political parties and protesters.

Reading Morocco's New Constitution: The King Proposes Limited Changes

Some have called the changes "revolutionary," others believe that they are no where near being enough. It all depends on your viewpoint. Here is an article from the New York Times about King's speech on Morocco's new constitution. ___________________________________________________
Morocco King Proposes Limited Steps to Democracy

By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: June 17, 2011

In a major effort to try to respond to calls for more democracy and accountability, King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced proposed constitutional changes on Friday night that would reduce his own nearly absolute powers and name a prime minister from the largest party elected to Parliament as head of the executive branch.
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But his plans fall considerably short of the constitutional monarchy that many protesters have demanded and leave the king with absolute control over the military and religious matters.

The proposals will be put to a national referendum on July 1 instead of in September as originally planned.

The prime minister, who would be formally called “president of the government,” would be able to appoint government officials and ministers and would have the power to dissolve Parliament. The judiciary would be an independent branch; the king has headed the council that approves all judges.

It would mean a “government emerging through direct universal suffrage,” the king said in an eagerly awaited speech on national television. The changes, he said, will “make Morocco a state that will distinguish itself by its democratic course.”

The king would remain head of the Islamic faith in Morocco and be called “commander of the faithful.” But a reference to the king in the current Constitution as “sacred” would be replaced by the expression: “The integrity of the person of the king should not be violated.” Islam would remain the state religion, but there would be a new guarantee of religious freedom.

The king, who is 47 and has been in power since 1999, has been facing growing pressure to respond to calls for democratic change and a constitutional monarchy from the February 20 Movement for Change, which began on Facebook and has carried out a series of rallies in major cities. While thousands attended the rallies, they did not compare in size to those elsewhere in the Arab world, and there has been relatively little violence or state repression of the demonstrators.

As the Arab Spring has rolled through the Middle East and North Africa, monarchies have withstood the demand for change better than secular autocrats. And Morocco, on the western edge of the region, has not escaped the demand for change. The king, who is considered a reformer and a more gentle ruler than his feared father, King Hassan II, has been criticized for stalling far-reaching reforms after terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003.

He has also been accused of allowing the advisers and former schoolmates around him to become wealthy from state contracts and monopolies, and of tolerating corruption.

But the proposals he unveiled on Friday were a considerable effort to try to get ahead of the calls for change.

In the last few months, he released some 200 Islamist prisoners who had been jailed in the roundups that followed the 2003 bombings.

The final draft of the reformed Constitution explicitly grants the government executive powers. Government ministers, ambassadors and provincial governors would be appointed by the prime minister, subject to the approval of the king. The prime minister could dissolve the lower house of Parliament after consulting the king, House speaker and head of the Constitutional Court.

And in another response to demands from protesters, Berber will be made an official language alongside Arabic.

The king said that the constitutional reform “confirms the features and mechanisms of the parliamentary nature of the Moroccan political system” and lays the foundation for an “efficient, rational constitutional system whose core elements are the balance, independence and separation of powers, and whose foremost goal is the freedom and dignity of citizens.”

The proposed changes did not satisfy all the protesters, who say they will continue to hold rallies pressing for more change, including one scheduled for Sunday.

Najib Chawki, an activist from the February 20 Movement, told Reuters that the reform “does not respond to the essence of our demands, which is establishing a parliamentary monarchy. We are basically moving from a de facto absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.”

But many Moroccans will see the changes as a judicious effort by the king to promote a gradual move toward democratic accountability. Mohammed Nabil Benabdallah, secretary general of the small Party of Progress and Socialism, said they show Morocco is entering a new era.

“There will be a new balance of powers,” he told Bloomberg News. “It paves the way toward the establishment of a democratic state.”