Journal d’un Prince Banni or Diary of a Banished Prince - A Critical Look at the Moroccan Monarchy

Here is a piece from the NYTimes about the latest book by Prince Moulay Hicham which gives some insight into palace politics and makes a call for real political change in Morocco.
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Morocco’s Rebel Prince Shines Harsh Light on the Kingdom

credit: http://www.my-world-travelguides.com

by Aida Alami

PARIS — He sat in the car, frozen with fear, as gunmen pointed rifles at his pregnant mother in the driver’s seat beside him. They were rushing to the king’s birthday party because they had heard there was a commotion. It was the summer of 1971, and the Moroccan Army killed over 100 party guests in its attempt to overthrow the monarchy. The gunmen spared the pregnant woman and her 7-year-old son. Later that day, the coup failed.

With his monarchy preserved, King Hassan II sharply tightened his grip on his subjects, including his own family.

It was a shift that the 7-year-old, Prince Moulay Hicham El Alaoui, still remembers well. The eldest son of the late King Hassan’s only brother, Moulay Abdellah, he is also the first cousin of King Mohammed VI — making him third in line to the Moroccan throne.

Nicknamed “the Red Prince,” he grew up to become a political activist whose public support for democracy has put him at odds with his family in Morocco. He exiled himself to America and was banned from the presence of the king for advocating a constitutional monarchy, like that in England or Spain.

In a culture where princes are expected to hold their tongues and where family affairs do not leave the palace walls, Prince Moulay Hicham isn’t welcome.

“It’s been traumatizing. I have seen a father destroyed. It is a world where everything is artificial and nothing is genuine,” the prince, now 50, said during an interview at his hotel in Paris. “I am happy to live far away. Instead of having 100 friends, you have five friends, but at least you know that they are here for you.”

In April, he published a new autobiography, “Journal d’un Prince Banni,” or Diary of a Banished Prince, that weaves together a series of vignettes and anecdotes to give readers a rare glimpse into Morocco’s royal family. But it also serves as a harsh political critique of the kingdom from an insider.

The book, which will be translated into English in a few months, details how King Hassan, who died in 1999, constructed an opaque system of rule in which an elite could flout the law with impunity. Though he celebrates the late king’s undeniable grandeur, the prince describes him as an evil genius who brought Morocco onto the world stage. He also gives an intimate view of life inside the palace, growing up among the intrigues, and the mind games between him and his uncle.

FULL ARTICLE

Judges in Morocco Lead Sit-in for Autonomy

The sit-in of 1,000 judges in Morocco calling for autonomy, freedom to not have decisions be "bought" by prestige or money is worth noting.  Here is the Associate Press article via The New York Times. 
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Judges in Morocco Lead Sit-In Calling for Autonomous Judiciary

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published: October 6, 2012

RABAT, Morocco (AP) — 

About 1,000 Moroccan judges held an unprecedented sit-in Saturday in front of the Supreme Court, calling for greater independence for the judiciary.

The rare demonstration was organized by the Judges’ Club, a group formed in August 2011 to push for judicial reform. The group has been officially banned, but is tolerated. 

Morocco’s courts have historically been weak and under the control of the king and his Justice Ministry, which determines judges’ salaries and appointments so that they will often rule as instructed for the sake of their careers. 

“We have no protection, no rights, we have a miserable salary, we work in catastrophic conditions,” said Nazik Bekkal, a judge from Sidi Kacem in northern Morocco, at the demonstration. “Above all we are not autonomous, very simply, and that’s what is most important. It’s the autonomy, the independence of the judiciary, that’s what we really are looking for.”

Yassine Mkhelli, a judge from Taounate in northern Morocco and founder of the club, said more than 2,200 judges — about two-thirds of the country’s total — had signed a petition calling for reforms. 

In May, judges across the country wore red armbands to protest official interference in the judiciary in another action organized by the club. Morocco’s new Constitution, passed last year, does give the judicial branch greater powers and independence but has yet to be implemented. 

The justice system is one of the most sensitive issues in Morocco, a North African country of 33 million. Many Moroccans believe that it serves the highest bidder.

Critics say verdicts in civil trials can be bought for just $5,000, while a phone call from a high official is enough to seal a guilty verdict in the case of terrorism or political trials. 

The Justice and Development Party, an Islamist group which won last year’s elections, made battling corruption and creating a truly independent judiciary a main plank of its campaign, but judges say little has changed.

“This issue concerns all the Moroccan people who deserve a truly independent judiciary,” said Judge Mohammed Anbar of the Supreme Court, the vice president of the club.

My Makhzen and Me - The Film - أنا ومخزني

I attended a showing of the film My Makhzen and Me by Nadir Bouhmouch today. There hasn't been much written up on it in English. The film is a respectable attempt to start an honest discussion about political and social issues in Morocco; and its good that Bouhmouch is honest about his own privileged background.

Here is an earlier article about the film from Al-Akhbar English. There is also a recent article about the film in French from SlateAfrique "Nadir Bouhmouch, la bête noire des dirigeants :Réalisateur de My Makhzen & Me, Nadir Bouhmouch dénonce dans son œuvre, la "corruption des «élites»"
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February 20th Movement in Retrospect: The Treacherous Path of Reform

By: Samia Errazzouki

Published Thursday, January 5, 2012

Morocco, like its North African neighbors, has recently seen the rise of a leaderless pro-democracy movement. The February 20th Movement drew on inspirations from movements in Tunisia and Egypt, while adapting its message to the political context of Morocco.

But the path of change took on a more moderate tone. Unlike neighboring pro-democracy movements, the February 20th Movement called for political reforms, not the ousting of the regime. Every Sunday for about eleven months, members of the movement have marched on the streets to put pressure on the Moroccan regime, resulting in a new constitution and parliamentary elections in which the Islamist Party of Justice and Development came to power. The movement’s inclusive nature has drawn a wide array of activists who contribute in different ways to the growth and maturity of a campaign that initially began as a call for protests on Sunday, February 20.

As they look back at their experience, Moroccan activists are proud of their achievements despite the need for continued struggle. One of the most familiar faces of the February 20th Movement is Zineb Belmkaddem, a single mother based in Rabat who can often be seen as the face of the movement on international news networks or the figure holding the megaphone in a march leading chants. Her role in the movement, like many other activists, grew out of accumulated frustration over a combination of living conditions and the political system in Morocco.

“When I saw what happened in the other Arab countries, I wanted to express all these feelings, and after I watched the first call for protests on Youtube, I had tears in my eyes and decided the journey would start there, and it did,” explains Zineb.

When asked about her role in the movement, Zineb responds, “I can't think of something I haven’t done.” With her multi-lingual background, she found herself speaking on behalf of the movement on major media outlets, including France24, Al Jazeera, and PBS. Within the movement, she has worked with logistics in addition to coming up with slogans that have since been chanted throughout the country. Online, she also regularly provides coverage on the protests.

The movement has struggled in gaining popularity within Moroccan society, which remains predominately apolitical. Zineb counters the widespread criticism, “Our role is to steer this movement and our society, as individual citizens and groups, towards positive change and democracy.” Sure enough, within less than three weeks of the movement’s first protest, King Mohammad VI announced constitutional reforms on March 9.

But the biggest accomplishment was the movement’s ability to act on its dissent independently of the Moroccan government. Zineb emphasizes, “Moroccan people deserve to do positive things for Morocco without having to get blessings, guidance, and orders from the king.”

Without limiting themselves to the February 20th Movement, Zineb, along with other pro-democracy activists are working together to form a political party, the Moroccan Pirate Party, whose three goals are education, transparency, and rule of law. The party channels the spirit of the pro-democracy movement with the aim of working within existing political institutions. The Pirate Party hosts members throughout the world.

One of the members of the Pirate Party, a Moroccan blogger based in France, is also an active figure in Morocco’s pro-democracy movement. Hisham Almiraat, has been on the media front of the February 20th Movement through his role in co-founding Mamfakinch, a citizen media platform which provides consistent coverage on the movement. Hisham explains how the idea for Mamfakinch emerged out of frustration over the Moroccan government’s hold on mainstream media outlets and the need to provide an outlet for the movement to reach an audience.

“We found ourselves as an extension of what was going on on the ground,” reflects Hisham. Within just weeks of the movement’s start, Mamfakinch became a major source for footage, images, and accounts of the movement’s developments. Their weekly liveblog and mapping of protests in Morocco draws a regular online audience throughout the world. Mamfakinch maintains an international audience by publishing in Arabic, English, and French, powered by a volunteer based network of activists, writers, and professionals.

The project has not been without challenges. Hisham admits that one of the major obstacles has been competing against print media in a country where the internet is not a key source for information, an issue tied to a 56 percent literacy rate. However, what sets Mamfakinch apart is its uncensored material, which Hisham highlights as an advantage to its audience, given the tools to interpret the content on their own.

Nadir Bouhmouch is another Moroccan activist who is working on propelling the movement’s message to a greater audience, both within Morocco and throughout the world. Nadir is currently studying Film and International Security/Conflict Resolution at San Diego State University and is also the president of his local chapter of Amnesty International. He has spent the last several months in Morocco pairing his fields of study working on a film project titled, My Makhzen and Me, which chronicles the February 20th Movement and the tactics used against the movement by the regime.

After attending multiple protests and meetings with members of the movement, Nadir noted a general failure to use art to further the movement. “Art is a great way to expand the numbers beyond those protesters who have become regulars at every demonstration,” says Nadir. He mentions detained Moroccan rapper, L7a9ed, whose music has been critical of the Moroccan regime, while his detainment has been a major rallying point for the movement.

Nadir stresses the need for arts in addition to the weekly protests, “Going out to the street is the most direct and effective way to get a government to its knees, but the streets have to be complimented by the arts.” His film, My Makhzen and Me, is due for release on 20 February 2012, the one year anniversary of the movement.

Moroccan Elections are not the "model" for Arab Spring as the West Claims

Here is an opinion piece from the CSM offering some insight on Morocco's elections.
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Morocco elections aren't a model for the Arab Spring as West claims

Contrary to the West's view, Morocco's parliamentary elections this weekend didn't signal a bold step toward democracy. They showed just how far the country has to go to achieve real reforms – and how much more power the king must give up.

By Ellen Lust / November 28, 2011

Rabat, Morocco

As the world turned its attention to the massive and sustained demonstrations in Egypt last week, much smaller but nevertheless significant protests took place in Morocco leading up to Friday’s parliamentary elections. As the country prepared for the first elections since King Mohammed VI implemented reforms last summer to give that body more power, thousands of Moroccans took to the streets in Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangier, calling for regime change.

The demonstrations highlight the wide gap between the West’s vision of Morocco as a leading example of how to transition into democracy, and the average Moroccan’s view of a regime reluctant to release power.


The West has been veritably giddy about King Mohammed VI’s “progressive” democratic reforms – implemented to head off Arab Spring turmoil and appease protesters. American Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton heralded the constitutional reforms that paved the way for this Friday’s elections as an “important step toward democratic reform” by a “longstanding friend, partner, and ally of the United States.” French President Nicolas Sarkozy, too, commended the king for embarking on a “path to democracy."

Yet viewed from within, the constitutional reforms passed in July look very different. Under the new constitution, the king loses his “sacred status” and appoints a prime minister from the majority party in parliament. But the king has not loosened his grip on ultimate power, maintaining control over the religious establishment, the military, and all security matters. He can also implement “emergency law” and maintains veto power over all minister appointments. All laws must still be confirmed by the king.

Independent voices from the opposition were not involved in the reform process this summer. The ultimate demands of the February 20 Movement for Change movement were not met. Rather, the king relied on the political parties that have historically supported his monarchy to pass the initial reform.

Indeed, the 98.5 percent approval rate in the July 1 constitutional referendum highlighted how little had changed. If anything, the extraordinary rate reflected the authoritarian rule of the king’s father, Hassan II, more than the democratic reform of the “progressive” king.


Still, Friday’s elections showed signs of progress. Voter turnout was up from 37 percent in the last elections to 45 percent. And the moderate Islamist PJD (Justice and Development Party) – the former opposition party – earned unprecedented success, coming out on top with 107 of the parliament’s 395 seats. These developments suggest real reform may be possible. But there is a long way to go.

Parties played old political games. A pre-electoral alliance of eight ideologically diverse parties, from Islamists to conservatives, is better understood as a vehicle for political ambition than of ideologically driven, vibrant political parties. The counter-alliance prompted many to see the parties as dividing spoils before elections, with little regard for the voters. They were engaged primarily in a quest to be close to the center of power, not a struggle for change.

Citizens were largely disengaged. When the campaign season opened Nov. 12 there was little sign of the upcoming polls. Earlier this month, as I walked Rabat’s brightly decorated streets, crowded with people celebrating the end of Eid, only headlines unveiling party platforms and political intrigues hinted at impending elections.

Campaigns did gather some momentum as the election approached, but not because people believed they would change Morocco’s political future. Rather, many hoped to take advantage of the electoral season to draw candidates’ attention (and resources) to local problems. Others hoped to benefit more directly – and often financially – from mobilizing the “electoral market.”

Few believe the new parliament will solve the many problems plaguing nearly 35 million Moroccans, where 1 in 3 young, urban males are unemployed and poverty is widespread.

A large part of the struggle over Morocco’s democratic future is not taking place within the elections, but outside them. A broad-ranging opposition coalition, from small leftist parties to the Feb. 20 movement, which arose at the beginning of regional Arab uprisings, and the popular, outlawed Islamist Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane group, called for a boycott. They hoped to use elections to call for real change.

And although voter turnout remained strong, their movement had an effect.

Campaign pamphlets and speeches frontlined calls for dignity, social justice, and fighting corruption, all brought to the fore in last spring’s demonstrations. Demonstrators, while small in number, made surprisingly strident calls for a change in regime, often drawing greater attention than the election rallies.

Perhaps most important, the parties reminded observers that the changes that followed last spring appeared more dramatic to the King’s Western allies than they did to most Moroccans.


Morocco’s problems remain unsolved, fueling widespread discontent and continued demand for reform. In the new Arab world, sluggish, half-hearted reforms of the last two decades no longer appease the people, in Morocco or elsewhere. Friday’s elections, and a parliament led by the moderate Islamist PJD party, may be a step forward in democratic reform. But, to make this hope a reality, the king still needs to take significant steps toward relinquishing power.

Ellen Lust is an associate professor of political science at Yale University specializing in Middle East politics.

Young Moroccans Unlikely to Stop Pushing for Democratic Change

Here is an article from the New York Times on the Moroccan youth movements dissatisfaction with what some believe to have been a move towards democracy in the country.
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Morocco's Democratic Changes Fail to Appease All

By AIDA ALAMI
Published: July 20, 2011

RABAT, MOROCCO — A stressed middle-aged woman in a taxi in Casablanca looked with disdain at thousands of protesters on a main avenue. “We are fed up with them,” she told the driver. “Can’t they just leave us in peace. They wanted a new constitution. They got it. What else do they want?

“They are fighting for our rights,” he replied. “I hope they keep on marching until our health and education systems are fixed and corruption, the biggest ill of this country, is gone.”

A landslide vote in a July 1 referendum paved the way for a new constitution, introducing more freedoms and gender equality. The constitution was approved by 98 percent of those who voted, winning King Mohammed VI congratulations from world leaders, including President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

But critics dispute the validity of the referendum, saying that only 13 million of 20 million eligible Moroccans were registered to vote. They also say the constitution fails to enshrine significant separations of powers within the government.

Leading democracy activists including the February 20 Movement for Change, which began on Facebook and has carried out a series of rallies in major cities, have rejected the outcome and pledged to continue to fight for the establishment of a fully democratic state.

Abdeslam Maghraoui, a political science professor at Duke University in North Carolina specializing in North Africa, said the referendum was a short-term fix for Morocco’s problems.

“It seems that the monarchy and its supporters have managed to pull together a hasty and contested constitutional referendum,” he said. “This will give the monarch a few weeks or months to claim a political victory.”

Mr. Maghraoui said irregularities in the voting process and opposition from large segments of civil society, the main Islamist movement and some political parties had delegitimized the process.

“I would not be surprised at all if we go back to an atmosphere of crisis and possibly violence before the end of the year,” he said.

When the February 20 movement started organizing, shortly after the fall of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, the Moroccan regime activated an extensive propaganda campaign to paint protesters as enemies of the state manipulated by the Western Sahara liberation movement, Polisario.

Still, the movement, linking human rights activists, small leftist parties, youth activists and a banned Islamist party, Justice and Charity, mobilized thousands of people in more than 50 cities and it has since organized marches every Sunday, countrywide.

Its most significant victory has been to raise awareness among Morocco’s politically disengaged youth, who for the first time decided to get involved. Two weeks after taking to the streets, the movement gained ground when the king, in a speech on March 9, promised significant constitutional changes and the introduction of more personal liberties. He then appointed a commission to draft a new constitution, which he unveiled on June 17.

Still, the king’s call to Moroccans, citing the Koran, to vote for the charter was perceived by opponents as an improper interference in the process.

Mehdi Soufiani, a 24-year-old law school student in Rabat, said: “The king is an arbitrator. He shouldn’t have influenced the voters, making the vote about his popularity and not about whether the constitutional changes are what the country needs.”

In July, an organization of Moroccan students in France, Cap Democracy Morocco, which advocates the establishment of democratic institutions, organized a three-day workshop in Rabat that invited young people and scholars to a discussion titled, “Thinking Democracy After February 20.”

Younes Benmoumen, a 24-year-old graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies and president of the association, called the referendum a plebiscite on the king and the constitutional changes only cosmetic.

“There is a complete absence of a democratic spirit in the constitutional reform process,” Mr. Benmoumen said, “and no actions were taken to show a willingness of the regime to change.”

During a debate at the Cap Democracy workshop, many raised concerns that the movement had failed to assemble crowds as large as in Tunisia and Egypt and said it risked running out of steam and dying out.

Fouad Abdelmoumni, a member of the Coalition for Parliamentary Monarchy, a group of parties and activists that supports February 20, told young people at the workshop: “A push for radical change in society is only starting to bloom. It will not easily happen. Protesters are going to need to show endurance and patience because the road is still long.”

Najib Akesbi, an economist who teaches at the Institute of Agronomy in Rabat, predicted that the coming legislative elections would send people into the streets again. He said the referendum vote was flawed by coercive pressures from imams and local government officials, vote rigging and one-sided broadcast media coverage.

“Absolutely nobody knows what the majority of Moroccans think as a result of years of repression,” he said. “The movement remains strong in its fundamentals, at its core, and the protesters remain very determined. After Ramadan and summer, the protests will very likely intensify in September.”

Analysts say the newly engaged if widely disparate groups of young Moroccans are not likely to stop pushing for change. That assessment echoes what the young protesters themselves say.

“We are fighting for something meaningful and we will win,” said Mr. Benmoumen. “We are not subject to any deadline, and the course of history is on our side.”

In Morocco: Voting Early and Often

Few are surprised that the "vote" for the constitution passed.
Here is an interesting piece from Al-Arabiya on voting irregularities in Morocco, which actually seem to be par for the course.
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Mustapha Ajbaili: In Morocco, ‘Vote early and vote often’ even if the results are preordained

Saturday, 02 July 2011
By MUSTAPHA AJBAILI

On the day my country was asked to go to the polls and say “Yes” to a new constitution, I called my parents who live in a tiny Berber village southeast of the country to ask them if people were going to vote.

My father told me that local authorities, represented by the Moqaddam, brought him voting cards for me and for my brothers who live outside the country. The Moqaddam asked my father to cast vote on our behalf.

This was without the apparent consideration to the fact that we might vote in our consulates abroad. Apparently it was O.K. to vote twice than not vote at all. Amid calls for boycott, turnout was key in the first constitutional referendum during the reign of King Mohammad VI.

Videos of people casting ballots without neither voting cards nor national ID cards are abundant on the Internet. In some cases, authorities used school buses to transport the elderly from remote areas to the voting centers.

The voting activities on Friday, of course, quickly spawned jokes on the Internet. Here’s one popular joke:

A man voted “No” for the new constitution by mistake. As he walked home, he realized his mistake and returned to the polling center to ask officials if he could change his vote. They told him: We already corrected that mistake for you, just don’t do it again.

But in this referendum, there is something positive, after all: I found out that the Moroccan administration is so developed and advanced that it could count ballots nationwide, including from hundreds of villages scattered and isolated in the Atlas mountains, and do this in record time--four hours after the closing of the polling centers. What an extraordinary job you have done, my country.

A One-Sided Campaign for the Moroccan Constitution, or Stop Praising Morocco for Being a Model of Reform it Hasn't Yet Become

Constitution. Can't live with one, can't live without one (apparently).
Here are links to 3 recent articles from the Guardian, The Brookings Institution, and AFP about the Moroccan constitution and the run-up to the typically one-sided election. The Brookings article is also pasted below.
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One Sided Campaign Spurs Moroccans to Vote "Yes" to Reforms

Morocco's Moment of Reform?

Morocco's Reform Reflect Real Divisions Within the Society

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Morocco's Moment of Reform?

Anouar Boukhars, Assistant Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center

The Brookings Institution
June 28, 2011 —

Keen observers of Morocco have long argued that the gradual democratization of the rules of the political game will not materialize without bottom-up pressure from ordinary Moroccans. It is public outrage over corruption and political systems oriented around power and privilege that have served everywhere as a catalyst for systemic change. Despite the popularity of the monarchy in Morocco, there has been a growing mismatch between the public’s aspirations for development and democracy and ruling elites’ insistence that the existing institutional architecture is needed to accommodate gradual reforms while maintaining stability.

In the absence of a credible opposition willing to challenge the monarchy’s prerogatives, it seemed only a severe crisis of governance or external shock could force democratic change onto the policy agenda. That moment finally came with the stunning overthrow of the strongmen of neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. Those dramatic events gave birth to the February 20 protest movement. Despite its relative failure to mobilize large numbers of Moroccans, the protesters—a loose coalition of leftists, liberals and Islamists—injected a new nervousness in the corridors of power. The monarchy quickly grasped that the strength of the leaderless movement did not come from its numbers but from the legitimacy of their demands.

King Mohammed VI’s March 9 speech, in which he outlined parameters for constitutional change, was a direct reaction to the rise of new opposition forces. In an attempt to seize the initiative, he promised wide-ranging reforms, including an elected government and independent judiciary. He announced the formation of an ad-hoc committee entrusted with revising the constitution. The king’s preemptive moves, coming so quickly after the initial protests, helped in stealing some of the opposition’s momentum.

Indeed, the last two months have seen the February 20 movement lose some steam, limiting its ability to reach the levels of popular mobilization seen in Egypt, Yemen or Bahrain. In addition, public perception of the protesters has shifted as the movement struggles to articulate a workable vision for political change while shaking off suspicions it has been hijacked by radical Islamist forces. The horrendous terrorist attack in Marrakesh on April 28—in which 17 were killed—only intensified the uncertainty surrounding the movement and heightened anxiety that social and political agitation could end up benefiting violent Salafi movements.

These fears accentuated with the revolts of Salafi prisoners in May and the hardening of the February 20 demands, as reflected in their calls for cancelling the king’s popular Mawazine Festival (featuring Shakira) and direct attacks on Morocco’s notorious intelligence services (DST) for running secret detention facilities. The protesters’ targeting of the DST came at an inopportune moment, as the agency’s reputation for effectiveness was boosted with its swift arrests of the perpetrators of the Marrakesh attack. The February 20 refusal to back down elicited a violent response from the state’s security services, leading to demonstrations on May 29 in which dozens injured and one killed—the pro-democracy movement’s first “martyr.”

With King Mohammed’s June 17 speech outlining long-awaited constitutional revisions, February 20 finds itself at a difficult crossroads, trying—and struggling—to devise a response to one of the few Arab regimes that has demonstrated a flexible and apparently effective approach to the Arab revolts. Its lack of charismatic leadership and raucous decision-making process have also given the impression of a movement lacking in organizational discipline and riddled with ideological contradictions.

On the eve of the king’s speech, the balance of power between the regime and the protesters had clearly changed from the early months of 2011. In a move that kept labor unions and other syndicates off the streets, the government doubled subsidies, raised public sector salaries, increased minimum wage, recruited 4,300 graduates in the public sector, and cancelled farmers’ debt. Unlike the zero-sum political games of other Arab states facing turmoil, the Moroccan regime skillfully portrayed the promise of top-down reform as a win-win compromise between the old authoritarian constitution and the parliamentary monarchy model demonstrators have been calling for.

The new constitution provides for an “elected” prime minister drawn from the ranks of the largest party in parliament. With the king’s consent, he has the authority to appoint and fire ministers as well as dissolve parliament. Under the proposed reforms, parliament—which had long been relatively weak—now has the potential to play a more assertive role. The exercise of parliamentary oversight of the executive branch is strengthened by lowering the threshold for launching investigations (just one-fifth of its members) and introducing a censure motion against cabinet ministers (one-third). The new constitution also sets into motion a decentralization process, whereby more power is devolved to elected regional councils. On the flip side, the constitution maintains the king’s dominant position in Moroccan politics. He remains the country’s supreme religious and military authority. In matters of security—it is up to the king to decide what exactly that means—he, rather than the prime minister, will have the authority to convene the cabinet. In other words, the king will continue to have veto power over all major decisions.

Despite its failure to significantly limit the king’s powers, the new constitution provides a margin of political maneuverability that did not previously exist. The key question, then, is whether Morocco’s established political parties will use it. The success of the king’s reforms—thus far unrealized—will depend on the ability, or more likely the willingness, of parties and civil society organizations to maintain pressure on the monarchy and push the envelope further. Here, there is little reason to be optimistic. The parties’ responses to the king’s original March 9 speech were disappointing, as evidenced in their timid proposals for constitutional reform.

With few exceptions, none of the parties dared discuss the provisions outlining the king’s religious (article 19), “sacred” (article 23), and legislative (article 29) powers. Even the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), arguably the country’s only credible opposition actor, adhered strictly to the framework that the king laid out in his two major speeches. It should come as no surprise, then, that the political class assured the public that the proposed constitution exceeded their demands and expectations.

It is perhaps unrealistic—and at odds with much of political history—to expect King Mohammed, however benevolent, to voluntarily diminish his own relevance as monarch. Certainly, he can be blamed for falling short of February 20’s expectations, but the legal opposition, including Islamists and leftists alike, bears responsibility for failing to push harder. Of course, it is difficult to determine the origins of the problem. Political parties, after all, were legalized and allowed to participate in elections because they accepted the king’s legitimacy and prerogatives. They operate in an environment where speech criticizing the king—who the constitution considers “inviolable”—is criminalized.

Many Moroccans hold out hope that the youth wings of the established parties succeed in challenging (and perhaps dislodging) their compromised leadership of patronage-driven elites and politicians. Whatever its tangible successes or failures, the effects of the February 20 movement are undeniable. The movement has helped bring to the fore a new dynamic of young political activists mobilizing against entrenched power structures and calling for greater democracy and representation not just in Morocco as a whole but also within the political parties and organizations of which they are a part.

There is now, then, an unprecedented opportunity for both sides. The new constitution empowers the parliament and the political parties to play a more assertive role—if they choose to play it. The threat of revolt and instability—as well as their own indigenous protest movement—give them bargaining power vis-à-vis the king. Importantly, the constitution’s provisions also allow the king to use his unlimited prerogative to block real changes. What he does, and chooses not to do, is critical. As unlikely as it now seems, the best-case scenario is that the king follows the spirit rather than the letter of the new constitution, respects the will of his people, and resists the urge to intervene in affairs of the elected government. Constitutions matter, but what matters more is what people do with them.

This is where Morocco’s friends in the West come in. The time for prioritizing economic liberalization at the expense of democratic reform is over. While Morocco may be more “progressive” than most its neighbors, it is still a state that relies on political restrictions and repression, albeit with a subtler touch. The United States and the European Union should stop heaping praise on Morocco for being a model of reform it hasn’t yet become. American and EU policy must be re-oriented to focus on a number of critical priorities: freedom of association and speech, constraining the powers of the king and the makhzen (royal court), and strengthening the role of elected institutions, such as parliament. Meanwhile, economic aid, as the new European Neighborhood Policy states, must be linked to the idea of “more for more” with “precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions.”

King Mohamed has declared his commitment to substantive reform and democratization. It is only fair that the United States and Europe hold him to his own promises. The stakes are considerable. If constitutional reforms lead to separation of powers, independence of the legislature and judiciary, and a monarchy that removes itself from day-to-day rule, the regional implications could indeed be significant. Then—and only then—should Morocco be considered a “model.”

The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same ?

Here is a commentary from Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
It gives a good background to the main issues and parties involved in the constitution debate. At the end she comments that, "The new constitution might bring about significant change, but only if Moroccans continue to exercise pressure on the king."
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The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same?

Marina Ottaway Commentary, June 20, 2011

The constitution King Mohammed VI announced to his country on June 17 has been greeted by Moroccans with a great deal of ambivalence. Although it appears to be a foregone conclusion that a majority of Moroccans will vote “yes” in the referendum announced for July 1, many will do so with reservations. The young protesters who have been organizing periodic demonstrations beginning on February 20—hence the name, February 20 movement—have already announced that they do not intend to stop their actions. In fact, protests took place on June 19, drawing thousands of protesters in Casablanca and smaller numbers in other cities.
A large number of interviews during a recent trip to Morocco suggest that the king may well have succeeded in staying ahead of the protest that has led to the demise of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and plunged Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain into turmoil and violence. Whether this is just a short-lived victory in the first skirmish of a long battle or a turning point on the road to transforming Morocco into the Arab world’s first constitutional monarchy will depend not only on how the king acts in the coming months, but also on the capacity and willingness of Moroccan political organizations to build on the opportunities the constitution offers them. It may also depend to some extent on the persistence of a protest movement that has so far not been able to mobilize the huge crowds seen in Tunisia and Egypt.

Drafting the Constitution
The constitution, like all preceding ones, was written by a commission of experts appointed by the king, rather than by an elected constituent assembly or another representative body. It thus falls in the category of constitutions granted to the nation by the king, rather than those crafted by a representative organization embodying popular sovereignty. The guidelines for the new constitution were outlined in a speech given by King Mohammed VI on March 9 and the commission subsequently worked to flesh out an outline provided by the palace or, as Moroccans put it, “le pouvoir.” The commission was headed by Abdellatif Menouni, an advisor to the king, leaving no doubt where the directives came from.

The palace also set up a consultative body to work in conjunction with the commission of experts. The strangely named “mechanisme de suivi,” or accompanying mechanism, was also headed by an advisor to the king, Mohammed Moatassim, and functioned as liaison between the drafters of the constitution and political parties, labor unions, businessmen associations, human rights organizations, and other groups or even individuals interested in having an input in the new constitution. Some presented entire constitutional drafts, some only suggestions on key points. Once the submissions were made, however, there was no follow up or debate. The organizations were not shown a draft of the new constitution until June 8 and even then they were not shown a written document but only able to listen to an oral presentation that they discussed in a marathon ten-hour meeting. Inevitably, in the following days the country was abuzz with conflicting rumors of what the new constitution entailed, as various parties and individuals leaked their version to the press. The members of the “mechanism” only saw a written draft on June 16, the day before the king presented it to the nation in a televised speech. Similarly, the council of ministers was asked to vote on the draft on the same day of the public announcement.

Despite the narrow limits of consultation and participation imposed on the drafting of the constitution, the process was probably more open than previous ones. The mainstream political parties represented in the parliament accepted the process and have already made it clear that they will campaign for a “yes” vote in the referendum. This is not surprising, because the parties represented in the parliament are tame and more concerned about maintaining their prerogatives by supporting the initiatives of the monarchy than setting forth programs of their own. Remarkably, the Party for Justice and Development, the Islamist party that came in second place in the 2007 parliamentary election but remains in the opposition, has made it clear that it supports the new constitution, arguing that it contains sufficient guarantees of democracy. The major reason for the party’s acquiescence is apparently the desire to continue and complete the process of integration of the Islamists in the legal political process, a goal that the PJP has been working toward for years.

The February 20 movement on the other hand rejected the new constitution even before it was unveiled because of the manner in which it was drafted and pledged to continue protesting. The February 20 movement has never succeeded in mobilizing huge crowds similar to those that brought down Zine al Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. By the participants’ own estimates, their most successful protests were carried out on March 20 in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and a number of other towns, but even these protests were relatively small compared to those other countries experienced.

Like protests movements in other Arab countries, the February 20 movement is a leaderless and structureless amalgam of young people. It holds monthly general assemblies in the towns where it exists, with each assembly being autonomous of the other. The assemblies are open to the public and coordination among the different groups takes place, to the extent it does, via Facebook—the number of users in the country doubled in the last few months. The movement is looked at with suspicion by the mainstream political parties, although, as in other countries, the young wing of many parties have joined in without official blessing by the parent organization. The movement appears to have broad demands—essentially for democracy and jobs—but not anything that could be called a program.

Parallel to the youth groups that constitute the February 20 movement, a number of leftist political parties, independent labor unions, left-leaning human rights organizations, and Islamist movements have set up a Council to Support the February 20 movement. Most important among them appear to be the Islamist movement al-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity, or Justice and Spirituality as it insists on translating the name recently), the United Socialist Party (PSU), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH). Given the array and the ideological diversity of parties and organizations that belong to it, the support council is deeply divided with members forming alliances against each other. More structured than the movement itself, the support council holds meetings and issues communiqués, but it is not clear that the members of the February 20 movement themselves agree with the positions taken by the support council or even, as some conversations revealed, know of its existence.

Identity Politics
The two most controversial issues to surface during the debate over the constitution were related to the definition of the identity of the Moroccan state: whether Morocco should be defined as an Islamic state, and whether Morocco should recognize Amazigh, the language spoken by the Berber minority, as an official language.

The discussion concerning the place of Islam is caught in the problem of the relationship between Islamist parties and organizations and “civil” ones—the increasingly accepted word to denote parties that outsiders would define as “secular.” Such parties refuse to be characterized as secular, fearing the latter term can be interpreted as implying irreligiosity. The term civil not only has no such implication, but also put the religious parties somewhat on the defensive as being “uncivil.” The tension between Islamic and “civil” parties is not unique to Morocco but common to all Arab countries, particularly in this period of transformation. Indeed relations are even more difficult in Tunisia and Egypt. In Morocco, the Party for Justice and Development is legal and has been participating in several cycles of parliamentary and local elections. Although it remains a devil for some, it is at least a known devil. But the issue is far from being solved even in Morocco.

What exactly happened in the debate over the place of Islam in the Moroccan state remains difficult to understand with precision, in part because of the confusion between what different organizations actually said and what they are alleged to have said and in part because of the use of code words that are not always clear. Islamists have been accused by civil parties of having insisted that Morocco continue to be defined as an Islamic state. Islamists deny that this is the case and argue that they even favored a definition of Morocco as a “civil state with an Islamic reference.” On the other hand, there is no doubt that a suggestion that the constitution includes a reference to “freedom of conscience,” rather than the guarantee that people belonging to other religions would be free to perform their religious practices was vehemently denounced by the general secretary of the PJD as opening the way to unacceptable and provocative behavior such as public display of homosexuality and violating in public the Ramadan fasting. In the end, the constitution defines Morocco as a Muslim state in the preamble, and states that Islam is the state religion in Article 3, which also guarantees freedom of religious practices to all faiths. Compared to the text of most Arab constitutions—which proclaim sharia as one of the sources, if not the source of law—the new Moroccan constitution, like the previous one, is quite liberal. It should also be noted that in Morocco religion is an integral part of the king’s power: as the officially recognized “commander of the faithful” the king would see his position somewhat diminished if Morocco was not defined as an Islamic state.

The new constitution also recognizes Amazigh as an official language, despite the objections by conservative elements and by those who thought such recognition would dilute Morocco’s Arab identity. It also contains a reference to the plurality of influences on the Moroccan culture, including Andalusia, more broadly the Mediterranean culture, the people in the Sahara, Christianity, and Judaism. The compromise in this case appears to be language that makes it clear that the official status of the Amazigh language will be implemented slowly.

The King’s Power
Identity issues caused the most controversy while the constitution was drafted, but in the long run the real issue is how much power the king will exercise under the new constitution—and thus how much progress Morocco has made toward becoming a constitutional monarchy or, in the language favored in Morocco, a parliamentary monarchy where the king does not govern.

Even the most ardent supporters of the new constitution do not claim that the new charter reduces the king to ruling without governing. That, they argue, is neither possible nor desirable in Morocco. The new constitution reserves for the king three areas as his exclusive domain: religion, security issues, and strategic major policy choices. In addition, the king will remain the supreme arbiter among political forces. Under those rubrics, the king could very well control all important decisions, if he so chooses.

There are new formal limits on the king’s power. He cannot choose any prime minister he wants, but must respect election results and name “the president of the government,” as the prime minister is now called, from the party that received the most votes. The king will no longer participate in and preside over the meetings of the cabinet. Rather, it is the president of the government who now presides over the renamed Council of Government. However, the king presides over the cabinet, which in that case is still called the Council of Ministers, when security issues or strategic policy decisions are at stake. Since the constitution does not clearly spell out what would constitute a strategic decision, it appears that the decision is up to the king himself. His position as arbiter also gives him the power to weigh in on the most important issues.

The constitution undoubtedly broadens the power of the parliament, allowing it to pass laws on most issues; it takes steps toward protecting the independence of the judiciary; and it increases the role of a number of independent commissions. What it fails to do clearly and unequivocally is reduce the power of the king.

How much change
The new constitution might bring about significant change, but only if Moroccans continue to exercise pressure on the king. The history of political reform in Morocco shows the importance of pressure. The first big recent wave of change came when King Hassan was approaching the end of his life and understood the importance of opening up the political system some in order to facilitate his son’s rise to the throne. He was under pressure to make changes. King Mohammed followed on the path of reform, but progress was made increasingly slowly as he felt more sure of his position. It took the Arab Spring, with the example of what can happen to regimes that refuse to change and the beginning of street protest in Morocco, for the king to conclude that it was time to relaunch reform.

The impact of the new constitution depends on the way in which it is implemented. As an opposition legislator put it to this author, the constitutional text has potential. In order for it to be realized, the parliament has to adopt the necessary legislation and make sure that it provides maximum space for the political forces. The past performance by the parliament suggests that it is not a foregone conclusion that the parliament will make good use of the potential. Although Morocco has a stronger tradition of political parties than most other Arab countries, the parties suffer from the same problems as the entire political system does: they are top-heavy, internally undemocratic, with little renewal of leadership.

As a newer party more committed to change, the PJD may be less hidebound than other organizations, but one party is not enough. Furthermore, if the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) wins the parliamentary elections that will probably be held in October, the power of the king is likely to remain strong. The PAM was created by a friend of the king before the 2009 municipal elections. Not only did it perform well at the level of the municipalities, but it established a strong presence in the parliament without ever participating in a parliamentary election—members of other parties simply moved over to the newly created entity. Before February, the PAM was expected to do extremely well in parliamentary elections, but it is not so clear how recent events will affect it. There is no doubt, though, that if a party close to the king was to win elections the reform momentum could easily be dissipated. The outcome will also be affected by the capacity of the February 20 movement to stay alive if a large majority of Moroccans approve the constitution in a credible referendum.

How far the king’s top-down reform will go may well depend on the strength of a bottom-up push by political parties and protesters.

Reading Morocco's New Constitution: The King Proposes Limited Changes

Some have called the changes "revolutionary," others believe that they are no where near being enough. It all depends on your viewpoint. Here is an article from the New York Times about King's speech on Morocco's new constitution. ___________________________________________________
Morocco King Proposes Limited Steps to Democracy

By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: June 17, 2011

In a major effort to try to respond to calls for more democracy and accountability, King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced proposed constitutional changes on Friday night that would reduce his own nearly absolute powers and name a prime minister from the largest party elected to Parliament as head of the executive branch.
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But his plans fall considerably short of the constitutional monarchy that many protesters have demanded and leave the king with absolute control over the military and religious matters.

The proposals will be put to a national referendum on July 1 instead of in September as originally planned.

The prime minister, who would be formally called “president of the government,” would be able to appoint government officials and ministers and would have the power to dissolve Parliament. The judiciary would be an independent branch; the king has headed the council that approves all judges.

It would mean a “government emerging through direct universal suffrage,” the king said in an eagerly awaited speech on national television. The changes, he said, will “make Morocco a state that will distinguish itself by its democratic course.”

The king would remain head of the Islamic faith in Morocco and be called “commander of the faithful.” But a reference to the king in the current Constitution as “sacred” would be replaced by the expression: “The integrity of the person of the king should not be violated.” Islam would remain the state religion, but there would be a new guarantee of religious freedom.

The king, who is 47 and has been in power since 1999, has been facing growing pressure to respond to calls for democratic change and a constitutional monarchy from the February 20 Movement for Change, which began on Facebook and has carried out a series of rallies in major cities. While thousands attended the rallies, they did not compare in size to those elsewhere in the Arab world, and there has been relatively little violence or state repression of the demonstrators.

As the Arab Spring has rolled through the Middle East and North Africa, monarchies have withstood the demand for change better than secular autocrats. And Morocco, on the western edge of the region, has not escaped the demand for change. The king, who is considered a reformer and a more gentle ruler than his feared father, King Hassan II, has been criticized for stalling far-reaching reforms after terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003.

He has also been accused of allowing the advisers and former schoolmates around him to become wealthy from state contracts and monopolies, and of tolerating corruption.

But the proposals he unveiled on Friday were a considerable effort to try to get ahead of the calls for change.

In the last few months, he released some 200 Islamist prisoners who had been jailed in the roundups that followed the 2003 bombings.

The final draft of the reformed Constitution explicitly grants the government executive powers. Government ministers, ambassadors and provincial governors would be appointed by the prime minister, subject to the approval of the king. The prime minister could dissolve the lower house of Parliament after consulting the king, House speaker and head of the Constitutional Court.

And in another response to demands from protesters, Berber will be made an official language alongside Arabic.

The king said that the constitutional reform “confirms the features and mechanisms of the parliamentary nature of the Moroccan political system” and lays the foundation for an “efficient, rational constitutional system whose core elements are the balance, independence and separation of powers, and whose foremost goal is the freedom and dignity of citizens.”

The proposed changes did not satisfy all the protesters, who say they will continue to hold rallies pressing for more change, including one scheduled for Sunday.

Najib Chawki, an activist from the February 20 Movement, told Reuters that the reform “does not respond to the essence of our demands, which is establishing a parliamentary monarchy. We are basically moving from a de facto absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.”

But many Moroccans will see the changes as a judicious effort by the king to promote a gradual move toward democratic accountability. Mohammed Nabil Benabdallah, secretary general of the small Party of Progress and Socialism, said they show Morocco is entering a new era.

“There will be a new balance of powers,” he told Bloomberg News. “It paves the way toward the establishment of a democratic state.”

Thousands Protest for a New Morocco

Here is an article from Reuters Africa on the recent protests that took place across Morocco.
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Thousands of protesters demand 'A New Morocco'
Sun Apr 24, 2011 5:04pm GMT
By Souhail Karam

CASABLANCA, Morocco, April 24 (Reuters) - Thousands took to the streets of Morocco on Sunday in peaceful demonstrations to demand sweeping reforms and an end to political detention, the third day of mass protests since they began in February.

Desperate to avoid the turmoil that toppled leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, authorities have already announced some changes to placate demands that King Mohammed cede more powers and limit the monarchy's extensive business influence.

Some 10,000 people joined the protest in Casablanca, the largest city in one of the West's staunchest Arab allies. Marchers in the capital Rabat also denounced corruption and torture as well as unemployment, very high among youths.

Policing has been low-key for protests by the February 20 Movement, named after the date of its first march, particularly compared to the turmoil elsewhere in North Africa.

"This is more about the young ones than it is about us," said Redouane Mellouk, who had brought his 8 year-old son Mohamed Amine, carrying a placard demanding "A New Morocco".

"Our parents could not talk to us about political issues. They were too afraid. This must change," said Mellouk.

Although levels of popular anger have risen, ratings agencies assess Morocco as the country in the region least likely to become embroiled in the type of unrest that toppled Tunisian and Egyptian regimes and led to the conflict in Libya.

In Rabat, several thousand people marched through poor districts with high levels of unemployment and away from the centre, where the previous monthly demonstrations have been held. There was no sign of trouble.

DISAFFECTED YOUTH

A 74 year-old man in Casablanca who gave his name only as Ahmed said Morocco's youths were right to protest.

"Look at them. They are educated and like most young educated Moroccans, they are idle," he said. "Everything in this country is done through privileges. You need an uncle or a relative somewhere to get somewhere."

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, but the constitution empowers the king to dissolve the legislature, impose a state of emergency and have a decisive say in government appointments.

King Mohammed last month announced constitutional reforms to give up some of his powers and make the judiciary independent, but protesters want more.

There is also resentment at the royal family's business interests through its holding company SNI.

One of the banners waved by the Casablanca marchers depicted the King's holdings as an octopus with tentacles stretching out to subsidiary companies. "Either money or power," it said.

Islamists also joined in the protests, demanding the release of all political prisoners. Authorities freed 92 political prisoners, most of whom were members of the Islamist Salafist Jihad group, earlier this month.

In Rabat, the wife of Islamist Bouchta Charef, who has said he was tortured in prison while accused of terrorism, called for all Islamists to be freed.

"They have made my children homeless," Zehour Dabdoubu told Reuters. "Every month I move from one house to another. I'm persecuted because people think I am the wife of a terrorist."

The banned Islamist opposition group Al Adl Wal Ihsane has maintained a low profile at the February 20 demonstrations, but said it supports them.

"It's excellent what's happening in Morocco. It's a quiet revolution," Nadia Yassine, daughter of the movement's founder, told Reuters by telephone. "We're moving slowly but surely."

(Additional reporting by Zakia Abdennebi and Barbara Lewis in Rabat; Writing by Barbara Lewis; Editing by Matthew Tostevin)

© Thomson Reuters 2011 All rights reserved

Morocco's Monarchy : Reform or Fall

Here is an interesting editorial on the Moroccan Monarchy from the Economist magazine. ________________

Morocco's monarchy Reform or fall
Has the king’s promise of reform come in the nick of time—or not?

Apr 20th 2011 | CAIRO | from the print edition

WHEN a protest movement sprang up in Morocco on February 20th King Muhammad VI chose to ignore it. The next day he spoke of speeding up reforms, but ignored calls for radical change. This infuriated pro-democracy campaigners, who promised to protest again. But then, on March 9th, he suddenly changed tack, calling for a drastic overhaul of the constitution, echoing the protesters’ main demand. Parliament and the courts, he said, would become more independent. Power would be devolved to regional councils. The prime minister would have more clout. And the Berbers, known as Amazigh, would have more rights too.

Overnight, Morocco’s generally malleable political leaders and newspaper editors, who had at first rubbished the demand for a new constitution as subversive, became the keenest of reformers. They hailed the appointment of a committee headed by a leading lawyer to produce a draft by June, for endorsement in a referendum in September, as a sign that Morocco would undergo a “peaceful revolution”.

The king’s allies abroad rushed to congratulate him. Alain Juppé, France’s foreign minister, called his speech “courageous and visionary”. Hillary Clinton, the American secretary of state, praised his proposals, saying that Morocco was “on the road to achieving democratic change.” A recent tour of the country by Britain’s Prince Charles “confirmed that Morocco is stable”, according to the prime minister, Abbas el-Fassi. The promise of constitutional reform has been widely welcomed by Moroccans and may, for a while, avert the turmoil that has engulfed much of the region. But protesters have continued to take to the streets in big numbers every weekend since March 20th. Many say that a constitutional commission appointed by the king is bound to reaffirm his executive power. A Spanish- or British-style monarchy is not yet, they sigh, in the offing.


Though most of the protesters express respect for the person of the king, criticism of the manner in which his monarchy operates has grown. Too much power is said to be concentrated in his palace circle. Complaints are growing that the royal family owns too much of the country. The National Investment Company, known by its French initials, SNI, is said to control Morocco’s biggest bank, insurance company, dairy and cooking-oil firms, as well as a large acreage of real estate—and is now often castigated for its anti-competitive practices. The denigrators even carp at the king’s cultural policies and call for the Mawazine festival, an annual musical extravaganza held in the capital, Rabat, to be cancelled on the grounds of excessive cost.

Such outright criticism of the monarchy, which has become widespread, itself marks a small revolution. The protesters have also taken on the main political parties, whose leaders have previously tended slavishly to echo whatever the king says. This in turn has forced some of those leaders to become more critical. Journalists who had been exiled or kept out of print by the government in recent years have resurfaced online, with websites sympathetic to the protesters. In one dramatic case online journalists have aired a litany of corruption allegations against Moncef Belkhayat, the minister of youth and sports, challenging him to answer questions about the dispensing of government contracts. He has denied the charges, but such scrutiny is unprecedented.

Citizens’ initiatives are sprouting, with local councils and firms accused of corruption and overcharging for municipal services. The king’s constitutional initiative may lead to the institutional breakthrough many hoped for at the start of his reign in 1999. But if it stalls, a wave of even angrier protest may well erupt in September. So the next few months will be critical to the king’s survival.

Political Prisoners Freed By Moroccan Government

Alhamdulilah. Free at last. Great news from Maghreb , the release of the prisoners is attributed to the street protests. Keep up the good work Ya Shabab! Here is the article from Reuters Africa.
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Morocco frees 92 political prisoners after protests
Thu Apr 14, 2011 4:20pm GMT


* Pardon comes after biggest street protests in decades

* Preacher sentenced over Casablanca attack among the freed

By Souhail Karam

RABAT, April 14 (Reuters) - Morocco freed 92 political prisoners on Thursday, including a prominent anti-corruption activist and a controversial preacher, under a pardon issued by the king following street protests demanding democratic reform.

The pardon also commuted to limited prison terms death penalties for five others and life imprisonments for 37 others, officials from the National Council for Human Rights said.

Prison terms for 53 others were also reduced.

The majority of those freed or whose sentences were reduced were members of the Islamist Salafist Jihad group.

Mohamed Sebbar, appointed secretary general of the Council by King Mohammed in March, said the pardon was a prelude to a thorough review of the cases of political prisoners in Morocco.

Those freed included preacher Mohammed Fizazi, who was sentenced in 2003 to 30 years in jail after he was convicted of inspiring 12 suicide bombers to kill 33 people in Casablanca earlier that year, in Morocco's deadliest bomb attack.

Local human right groups have said hundreds, including Salafist Jihad sympathisers, were jailed after the attack in politically motivated trials, often without solid evidence.

Last month, King Mohammed announced constitutional reform to give up some of his sweeping powers and make the judiciary independent in Morocco, a staunch ally of the West.

It came after a youth-led movement called February 20 spearheaded some of the biggest anti-establishment protests in decades in the North African country, with demands that included the release of political prisoners.

"This pardon indicates that the king has once again picked up the streets' message," political analyst Ahmed el-Bouz said.

"SHAM CASE"

Five people who were jailed in 2009 after a court convicted them of plotting terrorist attacks in the country and who were among those freed were present at Thursday's news conference, including prominent figures of two moderate Islamist parties.

"I would like to thank the youth of February 20 Movement," Mustapha Mouatassim, one of them, said.

Abdelhafid Sriti, a correspondent of Hizbollah's al-Manar television channel in Morocco, was another released prisoner.

Mostly-veiled female relatives broke into tears and chanted "God is Greatest" when the group was brought to the Council venue in black cars.

One woman, Houria Amer, wept in disappointment when she realised that her husband Luqman Mokhtar, who was also jailed in 2009, was not among them.

"They have all been jailed unfairly under the same sham case. How can they free some and leave others in prison?" she told Reuters.

Corruption whistleblower and human right activist Chakib El-Khiari, jailed for three years in 2009 after accusing high-ranking officials of involvement in drug trafficking, was among those pardoned and freed.

Human rights group Amnesty International has said Khiari was a prisoner of conscience, detained solely for his anti-corruption statements and human rights activities.

According to U.S. diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks in December, corruption is prevalent at all levels of society and has become "much more institutionalised with King Mohammed".

The government earlier this month promised to protect corruption whistleblowers. (Additional reporting by Zakia Abdennebi, Editing by Gareth Jones)

© Thomson Reuters 2011 All rights reserved

To Kiss or Not to Kiss King M6's Hand?

Here is an short piece from the Arab News Digest of the UAE newspaper The National about calls to abolish the practice of kissing the King's hand. This should be the least of people's concerns regarding what needs to change about the Moroccan government, but it is a nice distraction. ___________________________________

Royal Moroccan protocol under review

"Media sources said that the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, might introduce fundamental changes to the royal protocol. An essential part is the habit of kissing the monarch's hand by citizens. The royal court, it is said, will issue a communiqué to finally and officially abolish this practice," reported Mahmoud Maarfouf in the London-based newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi.

Earlier, officials had called for a simpler and more practical royal protocol at a time when the role of the monarchy is under discussion within a constitutional reform framework, as Mohammed VI highlighted last month.

The Moroccan newspaper Al Osboa said that official sources from the royal palace confirmed that some customs were outdated. It is expected to release a statement on the matter shortly.

The minister of state and deputy prime minister Mohammed el Yazghi agreed, adding that there is no reason not to propose a new set of protocols that are acceptable to both king and country.

Kissing the king's hand was the subject of a special dossier published on Saturday by the Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki newspaper, an affiliate to the Socialist Union Party, where it called for new protocols that cancel outdated practices. They should keep up with the evolution of society, but without disrespecting Moroccans' esteem for the person of the king, said Moulay Ismail Alaoui, a senior official at the Party of Progress and Socialism.

Moroccan Journalists Demand More Freedom from Government Authorities

Here is an article from Magharebia.com concerning recent protests by journalists working for state run media in Morocco. They believe that being able to do honest reporting needs to be apart of the reforms that everyone is speaking about.
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Moroccan state media urges greater freedom

State press workers hope that the Moroccan king's promises of reforms will translate into enhanced media liberties.

By Siham Ali for Magharebia in Rabat – 01/04/11

As part of the reform process initiated by King Mohammed VI, Moroccan state television channels started broadcasting political debates, allowing greater openness to scrutinise the king's initiatives.

"People are watching political programmes more often, whereas before, most weren't interested in them because of what was said on them," teacher Zohra Belaid said. "We hope that this trend towards freedom of speech and expression will continue to develop on all levels."

Some experts and members of the public, however, doubt that the change is noticeable and call for altering the editorial policy of state channels.

Journalists staged sit-ins across the kingdom to demand freedom of expression and greater independence from the authorities. For them, political change must also involve reform of the state media, changes in editorial policy and the departure of those currently in charge.

It is impossible to imagine democracy in Morocco without far-reaching media reform, according to National Moroccan Press Syndicate (SNPM) chief Younes Moujahid. He said that the national debate about constitutional reform must be managed by credible and free media institutions.

The state audio-visual sector has long been stagnant and it's time to do something about this state of affairs, according to Mohamed Wafi, head of the union of TV channel 2M workers.

"Given the competition posed by satellite channels, and in order to restore viewers' confidence, the national channels must be reformed to address current expectations and needs," said Wafi, whose union staged a sit-in in Casablanca on March 18th.

Moroccans want to watch uncensored, high-quality shows with programming tailored to their needs, said Mohamed Abbassi, Secretary-General of the Democratic Audio-Visual Media Union. According to him, the aim is to earn viewers' loyalty through a new approach based on freedom of expression.

Meanwhile, Communications Minister Khalid Naciri said at a March 24th press briefing that the way in which the media is run is among the major areas of reform initiated in Morocco. He underlined that the issues raised within the state media would be dealt with as part of the agenda for the reforms under way, some of which relate to management, governance and organisational and legal aspects.

"The managing bodies of media institutions are listening to the demands that have been made, which they are considering in a positive light with a view to implementing the necessary solutions to them," he said.

Political analyst Samir Machouli argued that state media had a major problem in terms of credibility and must use ethical standards and present a diversity of viewpoints.

"The state media is discredited because of the censorship practised with regard to several topics, especially politics," he said.

"The winds of change are blowing, provided that the transformation continues, as this new era needs very strong media that reflects what is going on in society," Machouli concluded.

Will Morocco's King Deliver on Promised Reforms?

Here is a piece from the Arab Reform Bulletin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about the possibility of any real reform taking place in Morocco.
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Will Morocco’s King Deliver on Reforms?
Intissar Fakir
March 16, 2011

King Mohammed VI’s March 9 pledge to sponsor broad constitutional reforms following moderately-sized protests on February 20 distinguishes him from other leaders in the region, most of whom have offered too little in terms of reforms and offered them too late in the process of uprisings to make a difference. On the surface, King Mohammed’s proposed reforms are significant. But the lack of specifics about the depth of these reforms creates doubt in view of past experiences.
King Mohammed announced in a televised speech a process of constitutional change that will be put to a popular referendum. Proposed reforms would increase the parliament’s powers in unspecified ways, create a more independent judiciary, and grant elected officials executive powers at the provincial and local level within a decentralization scheme first introduced in 2010. Decentralization will redistribute power from an appointed governor to new regional representatives to be elected by the people. Under the reforms, the prime minister would have greater executive powers, and the revised constitution would contain greater assurances of political and civil liberties and human rights.

A commission headed by constitutional law expert Abdelatif Mennouni is tasked with consulting with representatives of labor unions, political parties, civil society, and other interest groups to discuss the scope of these reforms over the coming months. The 18-member commission will include representatives from professional syndicates and human rights groups (such as Amina Bouayach of the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights), political activists, judges, as well as technocrats such as Omar Izziman and Lahcen Oulhaj (who represents Amazigh/Berber interests). The committee’s recommendations will be reviewed in June and then put to a national referendum. The king indicated that as soon as these reforms are ratified, they will be implemented.

For reformists, the king’s proposal is promising, but some skepticism remains. The largest parties —Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), and the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) —have lauded the initiative and hailed the king as a statesman, while some on the left have criticized the appointed commission, saying it should have been elected and pointing out that many of those on the committee (particularly Mennouni) are too close to the monarchy. Most of the organizers of February 20 protests reacted in much the same way; they indicated that the commission does not represent them and demanded a decisive stand against corruption, release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of the press. All are waiting to see whether reforms will impose any checks on the king’s powers, the true test of their credibility.

Mohammed VI’s approach fits a strategy that he has adopted since taking the throne in 1999, when he distanced himself from the repressive policies of his father Hassan II. Among his first acts as a new sovereign was to dismiss Driss al-Basri, his father’s feared interior minister and close confidant. Mohammed VI invited Abdelrahman al-Yussoufi, an outspoken critic of the policies of King Hassan II, back from exile and allowed him to form a leftist-dominated government. At that moment Morocco seemed on the way its way to real change. The al-Yussoufi government started with high hopes and undertook an agenda of progressive reforms, but much of what was promised never materialized.

Nonetheless, the king emerged from this experience with a popular reputation as a reformer, while the politicians and technocrats were blamed for the failures of what he billed as foray into progressive politics. What followed was ten years of superficial change suggesting that the king was more concerned with making an early impression than with embarking on genuine reform.

The new chapter of promised constitutional reform could turn out to be similar in the sense that the king is once again outmaneuvering elected officials. The initial response of the government to the February 20 protests—promising to create jobs for several thousand recent university graduates—was a transparent attempt to tame and co-opt youth groups. The king’s subsequent initiative calls on groups across the political spectrum to take ownership of the reforms and become accountable for their failure or success. Even if this initiative is genuine, it will put pressure on the politicians who have clamored for a chance to lead and have long complained that the king does not give them room to operate.

Mohammed VI is trying to get out in front of demands for change rather than be chased by them. What is still unclear is whether he will agree to reforms that would place checks on his power and move Morocco toward becoming a true constitutional monarchy. For now at least and until the protesters speak again, the 47-year-old king is trying to cement his position by making himself an ally of the protesters rather than their target.

Intissar Fakir is a special assistant to the Deputy President of the National Endowment for Democracy. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the National Endowment for Democracy.

Addressing Poverty in Morocco to Extinguish Protests

Here is a piece from Public Radio International's radio show The World about the struggles Moroccans face in trying to earn livelihoods and about some recent moves made the Monarchy that seem to begin to at least acknowledge the problems. Clink on the link to hear the radio story too if you'd like.
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Morocco's anti-poverty, anti-protests
From PRI's The World 09 March, 2011 02:31:00

The monarchy in Morocco is trying to tackle poverty in an attempt to hold back protests.
By Gerry Hadden

At an outdoor market an hour outside Morocco's capital Rabat, farmers sell produce and spices under makeshift awnings. In a far corner, some men wearing traditional jelabas take a break for tea.

The men say they're struggling.

"There's no hospital here," one man said. "My wife was sick and she went to the hospital in another village. We spent a lot of money to get there."

The closest thing these poor peasants have to healthcare is a traveling healer, seated nearby, with natural medicines spread out before him on a white sheet. "I can cure your hemorrhoids," the healer yelled into a megaphone, "with my powder made from goat horns."

It's poor areas like this -- both rural and urban -- that have the Moroccan government worried during these weeks of regional unrest.

During national marches in February, Morocco's poorest rioted in cities like al-Hoceima. Six people died there when a bank was looted and set ablaze. Mohammed Oboukidi of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights said he doesn't condone such actions, but he understands why they happened. "Young people, illiterate, no housing, no education -- how can you imagine that they'll march peacefully without showing hatred and anger against people who are depriving them of basic rights?" Oboukidi said.

Morocco's King Mohammed VI, who remains popular in the country, is trying to keep public anger at bay, but he faces a conundrum. Reducing poverty takes time, and revolutions move quickly.

To demonstrate that he's listening, the King has just named a special council to help enact urgent reforms and, above all, to find ways to create jobs -- right now.

On a recent afternoon in Rabat, hundreds of unemployed university graduates gathered in front of a labor union headquarters. They were trying to get their names on a new government jobs list. This initiative, announced earlier this month, will create 2,500 new jobs for people with college degrees. A man named Driss Jelai said he has a degree in geography. He's been looking for work for seven years.

"We need reforms, Jelai said, "social and economic reforms in order for us to find jobs. If I could, I'd start my own company, but in Morocco it's too complicated."

Finding work for Morocco's educated youth is seen as a key to stability here. What Morocco needs most are high-tech jobs in research and engineering. But it lacks the universities to provide the training.

The King is building a new university on the outskirts of Rabat, dedicated to research and development. About 200 students started last fall at the International University of Rabat.

Eventually some 5,000 students are expected to study here.

The idea is to educate, and to create and patent products that can be built and sold in Morocco. One example is a tiny windmill for generating household electricity.

"It will work in very light winds," said a young engineer named Mohammed Emeen Barmousy. "It can also withstand winds up to 50 miles an hour. And it will cost only about $600."

Morocco only has nine engineers per ten thousand citizens. France, by comparison, has 130. Moroccan economist Medhi Lalou said Morocco does need more highly skilled workers. But building a sparkling new university isn't enough, Lalou said. Morocco must fix its crumbling elementary schools. Only about half of Moroccan adults can read and write. And for education reform to work, Lalou said, an even deeper problem needs stamping out: corruption.

"We know that the situation of corruption in Morocco is getting worse year after year," Lalou said. "And we know that without a free justice system we cannot lead a successful fight against corruption."

Many Moroccans complain bitterly about corruption and nepotism, especially in the public sector. Last week, dozens of foreign ministry workers protested outside their offices in Rabat. One man, who wouldn't give his name, said their boss never gives anyone a raise or promotion. He just hires his friends and family as a way to cover up the disappearance of public funds.

Protestor organizers hope to persuade people like these employees to put aside their individual complaints and join the larger call for reform.